Abstract: Despite the media attention lavished on short-termism, the UK perspective has not enjoyed any sustained examination of the sort Professor Mark Roe has undertaken in the US. The short-termist view provides that substantial weight is placed on current profits, leading to companies being managed according to these same short-term horizons, through transmission mechanisms from market to boardroom. This paper analyses whether short-termism in listed companies should affect corporate lawmaking in the UK. It examines market behaviour and the legal landscape, and the extent to which they dissuade or stimulate the corporate search for instant gratification. This paper assesses hostile takeovers, executive remuneration and shareholder activism as potential transmission mechanisms for short-termism. It finds that the first two are particularly effective mechanisms, while the third is circumscribed by the costs of collective action and rational apathy. The conclusion is that short-termism in listed companies should affect regulatory and legislative proposals in the UK. Breaking transmission mechanisms is crucial to prevent short-termism in corporate decision-making. Regulatory proposals are therefore suggested, endorsing Main's Career Shares and reform of the composition of remuneration committees.
Although short-termism has had an undeniable grip on the corporate legal imagination, 15 it has not benefited from a sustained examination from the UK perspective. This paper examines behaviour in UK financial markets, the corporate legal landscape in which the markets function, and the extent to which they dissuade or stimulate the corporate search for instant gratification. 16 It looks at whether the available evidence is reflective of a harmful short term focus, which requires action by legislators and regulators. For the short-termist argument to have traction, trading structures require a 'transmission mechanism' into a company to affect corporate time horizons, as otherwise directors could be 'free to decide on corporate investments and time horizons.' 17 Roe considered hostile takeovers as a transmission mechanism in the 1980s and that, currently, shareholder activism and executive remuneration could fulfil this role. 18 Each of these transmission mechanisms will be examined from a UK perspective.
This paper also analyses whether perceptions of short-termism alone can lead to managerial myopia, 19 where managers take actions to increase current earnings at the expense of long-term value, by virtue of their belief that short-termism afflicts the market. Turning to potential regulatory responses, the argument in favour of increasing board autonomy will be scrutinised and other regulatory recommendations will be briefly addressed. The author, in rejecting Roe's assertion that short-termism should not affect corporate law making, 20 concludes that there are effective mechanisms transmitting short-termism in the market to corporate decision-making to render the issue worthy of legislative and regulatory attention.
B. SHORT-TERMISM FROM LEGAL AND EVIDENTIAL PERSPECTIVES

The Corporate Legal Landscape
Shareholders dominate UK company law. 21 Section 172 of the Companies Act 2006 provides that a director must act in a way he considers 'most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole.' The 'preferable analysis' is that it requires directors to have regard to the long-term interests of shareholders and, in doing so, directors 15 ibid 979. Professor Mark Roe performed such an examination from the US' perspective in The Business Lawyer. Roe's analysis and terminology will be utilised throughout. 16 Kay Review (n 6) 14. 17 ibid 18 ibid 19 Istemi Demirag, 'Boards of Directors' short-term perceptions and evidence of managerial short-termism in the UK ' (1998) 28 and is 'untrammeled by the procedural and precedential niceties of the courtroom.' 29 The influence of shareholder-friendly groups in the development of the system 30 resulted in a prohibition on board frustration of bids.
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As a result, UK law facilitates the City of London's operations, and shareholders are the dominant force in both UK corporate law and UK takeover regulation. In UK corporate law, although directors may look to other stakeholder interests, their decisions must benefit the shareholders as a whole. UK takeover regulation also preserves shareholder interests and, unlike in the US, no action may be taken by a board to halt a takeover bid without contemporaneous shareholder approval. The powerful position of shareholders impacts upon the analysis in this paper and circumscribes what reform can realistically be achieved. 22 ibid. 23 
b) Decreasing Holding Periods
Short-termism may be observed in the shortening of investment horizons over the last two decades. 40 The average holding period in professionally managed funds is less than a year. 41 In 2010, turnover on the major equity exchanges was running at 150 percent per annum of aggregate market capitalisation which implies average holding periods of eight months: 42 a decrease from around five years in the 1960s. 43 The increase in derivatives trading, the majority of which mature in less than a year, is also symptomatic of shortening horizons. 44 On the significance of holding periods, Professor Alfred Rappaport posits:
[t]he shorter the holding period, the more the beliefs of others rather than long-term fundamentals become central to investment decisions. High turnover thus sets the stage for short-term earnings-based decision making or momentum-motivated trading.
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Momentum-based strategies and investment on the basis of estimated future earning and dividends have been compared to the hare and the tortoise. 46 The hare has 'bursts of success' while the 'tortoise plods steadily on concentrating on real value and wins the race in the end.' 47 Momentum trading and resulting distortions are seen as 'part and parcel' 48 of the trend towards increasing short-termism and high trading volumes, with emphasis being put on short-term price changes.
A commonly stated justification for increased trading is raising liquidity. However, in an imperfect market, 49 this increased ability to buy and sell may come at a cost, potentially bringing increased volatility and short-termism with it. Costs associated with increased trading for long-term investors include active management fees and associated trading costs, which can erode the value of funds. 50 Further, there is scepticism whether the liquidity benefits claimed would exist in the periods of acute market uncertainty when they might be required. an intermediary such as a fund manager manages shareholdings, the fund managers' concerns are transferred to the market. If these concerns relate to their own short-term relative performance, there will be increasing attention on market trends rather than on long-term value creation.
It is difficult for shareholders to deduce whether a company is making sound long-term investments, which may lead to short-term losses, or if short-term losses are caused by managerial incompetence. 61 This informational asymmetry between shareholders and managers may lead to shareholder reliance on current results, as it is easy to see whether the stock price went up on any particular day. 62 To an extent, this lack of investor knowledge binds investor confidence to the next set of financial results, leading to demands to increase share price and placing pressure on the board to do so. . 'Collective action' refers to the behavior of a group working to achieve a common goal. As shareholdings are increasingly dispersed, and shareholders are separated in terms of location with non-UK holders accounting for a majority of the UK equity market, the likelihood of groups of shareholders forming to reach a goal is unlikely as the costs of such activity would be likely to outweigh any potential result. 68 In this context, intermediation refers to a situation where third parties act as a middleman between investors and companies, such as mutual fund managers who actively manage capital pooled by investors and make decisions about which shares to purchase on the investors' behalf. 69 Kay Review (n 6) 30. 70 ibid 11.
Critical time horizons for asset managers are the timescale within which an asset manager's performance is judged (the performance horizon) and the speed at which the prices of shares revert to their fundamental value (the value discovery horizon). The shorter the performance horizon is relative to the value discovery horizon, the greater the incentive for managers to focus on the behaviour of other market participants rather than fundamental value, 71 ie the higher the likelihood of short-termism.
The design of asset managers' contracts also influences their behaviour and management of investors' funds, with fee structures based on short-term performance that encourage short horizons and momentum trading. 72 Before hiring asset managers, investors review their 'performance relative to index benchmarks or […] relative to other asset managers.' 73 Consequently, the concern of asset managers is short-term relative performance and this triggers a 'vicious circle' 74 of increasing attention to market trends and diminishing attention to fundamental value, in other words, short-termism. This concern for short-term 
Conceptual and Factual Issues with the Short-Termist Argument
Roe identified substantial conceptual and factual debilities afflicting the short-termist argument, which may justify the view that courts and corporate lawmakers should be reluctant in allowing short-termism to join the considerations that go into lawmaking. 77 Certain select debilities will be assessed from a UK perspective, to consider if they offset the evidence in favour of increasing short-termism, altering the weight that ought to be afforded to the argument in policy discussions. 
a) The UK Economy
Several features of the UK economy may incentivise or facilitate long-term profitability, thereby counterbalancing short-termism to the extent that short-termism ought not to be a consideration for corporate lawmakers. This section assesses whether the presence of venture capital markets and private equity markets sufficiently mitigates short-term tendencies in the public market, such that short-termism is not a systemic issue and, therefore, should not be remedied by the legislature as though it is. Even if these features are insufficient to negate the corresponding short-termist features of the market, such as decreasing holding periods or the behaviour of funds managers, they provide alternatives to public ownership that could result in short-termism being problematic for certain companies, but not necessarily for the economy as a whole.
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The presence of venture capital markets, private equity markets and privately held firms may serve to mitigate short-term tendencies in the public market, meaning short-termism is not a systemic issue. Private equity encompasses a number of different types of transactions, but has come to be most closely associated with buy outs, 79 where private equity firms buy majority control of an existing or mature firm, or a publicly owned company which is then taken private.
Private equity holders tend to 'reorient its business model towards the longer term.' 80 The usual hold period by a private equity fund is three to five years. 81 If a company is overly focused on short-term financial results, therefore, marketplace incentives would be to move the firm into private equity's hands, where the horizons are longer. 82 Though private equity is far from perfect, the presence of alternatives highlights that there are offsets to short-termism, overlooked in many analyses. However, the presence of venture capital markets and private equity markets is not sufficient to counter all negative consequences of short-termism and does not alter the weight that should be afforded to the short-termist argument in policy discussions.
b) Long-Termism in the Markets
The short-termist view neglects the possibility that excessive value can be attributed to certain sectors and companies, such that the markets sometimes seem to be excessively long-term in their horizons. Market 'bubbles' illustrate this stock market long-termism, where excessive, intermittent high valuations are accorded to one sector or another of the financial market. will be clearer. Each of the three transmission mechanisms considered by Roe -hostile takeovers, shareholder activism, and executive remuneration 92 -will be analysed.
C. TRANSMISSION MECHANISMS FROM MARKET TO BOARDROOM
Takeovers a) The Market for Corporate Control
The market for corporate control 93 sees hostile takeovers as a key mechanism for aligning managers' interests with those of shareholders, with the threat of a takeover pressurising the board to generate profit. 94 One premise of the market for corporate control is that there is 'a high positive correlation between corporate managerial efficiency and the market price of shares of that company.' 95 If the managers' behaviour lowers the price of a company's shares, market participants will identify an opportunity to take over the company for less than it would be worth under superior management.
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Where there is a wide separation between share ownership and control, directors may engage in opportunistic behaviour. 97 This includes attempts to extract private benefits from the company or shirking duties 98 and leads to agency costs. 99 The 'crescendo' of the distinction between the corporate entity and its shareholders is reached in the context of a takeover. 100 The distinction, combined with a free market, means ownership can change over the management's head. 101 Therefore, in order to avoid issues of short-termism, boards must keep shareholders with increasingly short holding periods satisfied, ie unwilling to sell their shares to a predator.
Unsurprisingly, managerial focus will be on maintaining and maximising share price. Yet, companies seek to maximise current earning at the expense of sound balance sheets, capital 92 Roe (n 7) 985. 93 The 'market for corporate control' refers to how underperforming companies become attractive targets for hostile takeovers. Poor performance can be a reflection of problems with internal governance, which encourages potential acquirers to purchase a substantial number of the company's shares to take control of the board and replace the directors. The threat of a takeover pressurises the board to generate profit, aligning its interests with shareholders. 94 In the UK, the target board issues an opinion on an offer made to buy up a company's shares. 106 The Code does not limit the factors the board may take into account, nor does it require the board to consider the offer price as the determining factor in their opinion. In recent years, concern has increased about the vulnerability of UK companies to takeovers. The UK is 'one of a few major economies in which the hostile bid is free to flourish,'
with the company's fate left 'in the hands of the shareholders,' a group which may change throughout the course of a bid. 110 For instance, public opprobrium followed Kraft's unsolicited acquisition of Cadbury in 2010, with Sir Roger Carr complaining that the protracted takeover battle led to short-term investors replacing long-term institutional investors. He ultimately concluded it was too easy to take over UK companies.
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The Panel responded to this concern 112 by amending the Code in 2011 113 to increase protection against protracted 'virtual bid' periods, where a potential offeror announces that it is considering making an offer but does not commit to doing so. 114 A further amendment improved the quality of disclosure of the offeror's intentions regarding the target and its employees, 115 though the generality of many disclosures disappointed the Code Committee.
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These amendments lead potential bidders to be more circumspect when approaching potential targets, but rather than solving the problem, they delay it for a six month period. 117 This does not enable directors to take a long-term approach. The company is still vulnerable to share price volatility associated with the bid, as well as offers from other predators during these six months.
Therefore, hostile takeovers are capable of influencing the time horizon for decision-making, tilting it towards the short-term.
If holding periods are decreasing, investors' focus is on securing a high share price for sale, without concern for the long-term prospects of the company. In the UK, therefore, hostile takeovers can still act as transmission mechanisms, as board frustration of bids without shareholder approval is prohibited. 122 This leads to short-term behaviour by boards wishing to avoid being seen as potential targets. Executives' concern for retaining their position would be present without stock market short-termism, but the shortening of investment horizons intensifies pressure on executives and transmits shorttermism within the corporate decision-making body. The risk of takeovers is clearly an effective transmission mechanism of short-termism to the board.
Shareholder Activism
Shareholder activism refers to a range of actions taken by shareholder to influence corporate management and boards. 123 Shareholder activists are often viewed as investors who are dissatisfied with some aspect of a company's management or operations, and try 'to change the status quo through "voice," without a change in control of the firm.' 124 Actions range from threatening the sale of shares ('exit'), to asking questions at shareholder meetings and using corporate voting rights ('voice'). 125 This is referred to as the 'market for corporate influence.'
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Shareholder activism has proliferated in recent years, with activist shareholders occupying the thoughts 'and sometimes the nightmares' 127 of executives. In the US, activism has been described as the epitome of 'short-termism as an investment style,' 128 with inherently negative consequences. 129 Consequently, activism is perceived as a transmission mechanism, with investors using their 'voice' to express their wish for short-term returns, pressurising managers to restructure the company for short-term gains in share price. This section assesses on activism indicated little or no effect. 139 In practice, actions are difficult to coordinate and even completed actions are not impactful.
The efficacy of activism varies dramatically depending on its form, type of investor and the nature of proposals. 140 No significant impact was felt on short-term performance following remuneration demands, whereas abnormal short-term returns followed demands relating to board composition. 141 Though these studies were completed before the 'shareholder spring,' 142 they cast doubt on activism's status as a transmission mechanism, as activists' motivations cannot be identified. Interventions for corporate governance purposes, or failed attempts to make short-term gains, are indistinguishable. Further, they highlight the coordination costs involved in orchestrating an action.
While it is recognised there is a need for more long-term focus from investors, this
should not result in automatic condemnation of activist strategies that create shareholder value in the short term. Only when strategies destroy more value in the long term should they be subject to criticism and one must accept the unpredictability of business decisions, recognising the fine line between a bad decision and a good decision turned bad. Shareholder 'voice' is not inherently good or bad for a company's prospects, contrary to its portrayal in academic commentary.
Therefore, activism is not considered an effective transmission mechanism in the UK.
The market for corporate influence is arguably more developed in the US, 'helped by federal securities and state corporate laws that have greatly inhibited the market for corporate control.' 143 In the UK, the market for corporate control is far more effective as a spectre prompting directors to act myopically, with the market for corporate influence playing a lesser role due to its relative rarity, costs of collective action, 144 and associated rational apathy. ' Collective action' refers to the behavior of a group working to achieve a common goal. As shareholdings are increasingly dispersed, and shareholders are separated in terms of location with non-UK holders accounting for a majority of the UK equity market, the likelihood of groups of shareholders forming to reach a goal is low as the costs of such activity would outweigh any potential result.
Specific, intensive research is required to reach more than a provisional conclusion on UK activism, as most studies in this area relate to practice in the US.
Executive Remuneration
The structure of executive remuneration may lead to management replicating the time horizons of the market. If these are short-term oriented, executive remuneration may trigger the transmission of short-termism within the company. Executive remuneration is comprised of a base salary plus both short-term and long-term performance-related elements. 145 The shortterm element, normally an annual bonus, will often include both corporate and individual performance targets. The longer-term elements might include a share option scheme or another form of long-term incentive plan, often using restricted shares. 146 Remuneration 'should incentivise the manager to do his utmost to use his skills and experience to maximise the value that can be generated from the company's resources and not to use his power and those resources in ways that benefit himself.' 147 Linking payment to financial results was seen as a remedy for the perceived agency problem between shareholders and executives.
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Executive remuneration could be seen as a transmission mechanism as pay is conditioned on, and often delivered as, equity. Therefore, one can expect directors' decisions will take account of expected impact on share price. When remuneration is based on stock market returns, Roe states that management will tend to replicate the time horizons of the market. 149 This proves problematic if the market has short-term tendencies. This section assesses the formulation of executive remuneration and whether it encourages managerial myopia. It looks at who sets executive remuneration, the reason for high levels of remuneration, and the development of executive remuneration schemes in recent years.
a) The Remuneration Committee
The Reform has occurred in the structure of executive remuneration in an attempt to align it more closely with the long-term performance of the company. Previously, the granting of share options signalled a revolution in how executives were paid. Options linked payment to financial results, incentivising the executive 'to work at 100 [percent] of his capacity.' 157 The identification of the senior managerial class with the goal of share price maximisation became 'ever more complete.' 158 Stock options fell into disfavour however, as managers were free to exercise them when stock prices increased but could sit tight when they decreased. 159 Therefore, directors were not negatively impacted if their strategies were unsuccessful in the long run. Greenbury 160 encouraged a move away from options and toward other long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). The implosion of the 'dot com bubble' added momentum to this drive towards performance share plans. 161 The typical remuneration schemes then in use, particularly stock options, became viewed as 'rewards for failure.' 162 Tying share performance to reward is appealing given the information asymmetry and confounding factors that beset any analysis of 'true' executive value addition. 163 However, executives whose shares are overvalued have an incentive to defend that unrealistic price, which can lead to fraudulent behaviour. Remuneration based in any way on share price exacerbates this. 164 Ideal pay incentives reflect both upside potential and downside risk. The incentive that most closely aligns the interests of executives and shareholders is management holding shares. Yet, since the effects of important investment decisions are felt over longer time horizons than executive tenures, 'shares should be held up to or beyond the date at which the executive leaves office.'
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These considerations led to the increased use of LTIPs and by 2005, the use of performance share plans in the FTSE 100 was at 84 percent. 166 A commonly used performance measure for LTIPs is total shareholder return. 167 This measures return to investors over a fixed (commonly three-year) period and compares it to returns from comparable companies, or an index. 168 If a company earns lower than the median, the LTIP shares will not vest and any vesting is in proportion to the company's position on a ranking, with full vesting for upper quartile performance. 169 Despite these innovations and their accompanying adoption, doubts remain on the investor side over whether, for instance, three-year mechanisms are sufficiently long term to incentivise directors to focus on long-term value creation rather than short-term increases in share price. Meanwhile, managers may protest that total shareholder return is not truly reflective of executive behaviour as companies are 'at the mercy of market sentiment, particularly if it benchmarks against an index […] and is in an out-of-favour sector.' 170 This could be perceived as an instance where the dissatisfaction of both sides signals a fair compromise, albeit one that this author believes should be struck further in investors' favour, as will be discussed in the Regulatory Recommendations section of this paper.
c) A Flashpoint for Shareholder Concerns
In 2012, the 'shareholder spring' resulted in investors expressing their disapproval regarding executive pay in the exercise of their corporate rights, resulting in the dismissal of several pay was enacted. 172 The addition of a binding vote does not neutralise the possible effect of executive remuneration as a transmission mechanism. It retains the status quo, leaving remuneration committees to create remuneration schemes shareholders will approve of, hence rewarding directors for maximising shareholder value within these voting investors time horizons. The result is that it mimics any short-termism present in the markets. Currently, therefore, executive remuneration may be seen as transmitting short-termism and the addition of a binding vote on remuneration is unlikely to have a substantial impact on this fact. 173 The preferred approach would be to target the way in which long-term incentives are delivered so as to ensure that they are genuinely long term, and deter myopic behaviour by managers. 
Managerial perceptions of short-termism
Professor John Kay 'excoriated public company short-termism and sought means to reduce that short-termism.' 175 The Aspen Institute posited 'short-term thinking had become endemic in business and investment, and it posed a grave threat to the US economy.' 176 The 'motif' 177 is that a short-term focus 'has systematically robbed the economy of the patient capital it needs to produce sustained and vigorous economic growth.' 178 Investors, asset managers and executives are seen as focused on short-term and the general view is that executives ignoring this find themselves 'kicked to the street by impatient investors.' 179 However, let us assume shareholders take a long-term view but are not perceived to do so by managers. 180 If the argument that short-termism exists in the UK market is unconvincing, managerial perceptions of short-termism become significant. Behavioural biases play a role in encouraging short-termism. 181 By analysing questionnaire responses of boards of directors of over 200 listed companies, research conducted over 15 years ago concluded that if managers perceive the market will evaluate the company using short-term criteria, they will behave myopically. 182 Stein argues that even where capital markets are efficient, ie even when managers know they cannot systematically 'fool' the market, managers will be acting myopically. 183 Referring to the prisoners' dilemma, he advocates that all parties, in this case managers, try to cheat because they believe other managers are doing the same.
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For perceptions to induce short-termism, management's investment horizon would have to be shorter than that of the average shareholder or they would have to misread the market's preferences, for example by overestimating the extent or intensity of shareholder short-termism. Given the motif of short-termism as a systemic issue, possible overestimation of the intensity of short-termism by directors is not that far-fetched a proposition. These studies demonstrate the value of perceptions as a theoretical construct 185 in exploring short-term behaviour in companies. Perceptions of short-termism may be sufficient to transmit shorttermism to the corporate decision-making body whether or not short-termism actually exists in the market.
D. THE SHORT-TERMIST ARGUMENT AS PROXY FOR MANAGERIALISM
Managerialism is the belief in or reliance on the use of professional managers in directing a company. This ideology favours greater deference to the board of directors and less interference from shareholders generally. Its adherents have not been slow to seize on the increasingly fashionable issue of short-termism as further evidence that management knows best and shareholders are often a malign influence on decision-making. The managerialist analysis of short-termism posits that shareholders harbour short-termist tendencies due to their financial self-interest, whereas managers are more naturally aligned with sustainable company growth and long-term value creation. expressed regarding short-termism may be seen to be exploiting a topical concern to arrive at a predetermined policy outcome.
Insulation of the board from the shareholders, rather than reforming and detoxifying the feedback mechanisms between them, is the prescription for which managerialists reflexively reach. Thus, takeover protection is a prominent policy prescription 'induced by those who see 
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In the managerialist camp, Bainbridge has endorsed director primacy, 190 Blair and Stout espoused the 'team production' model, which conceives of the board as a mediating hierarch, 191 and Elhauge argued that managers must have 'discretion to sacrifice profits in the public interest.' 192 As a treatment for short-termism, proponents of greater board autonomy claim it fosters long-term sensible behaviour. These arguments pivot on the assertion that shareholders are best served by managers with discretion and autonomy. Shareholders are perceived as being poorly informed, prone to disagreements on corporate strategy and disruptive to the board if given too much authority to affect decision-making directly. 193 With greater insulation, management are granted the opportunity to take a long-term view of company's commercial needs rather than being pressured to adopt a short-term strategy to maximise shareholder value. 194 resort to short-term behaviour, 195 but generally, it does not appear the insulation of boards leads to higher R&D as one would expect if this argument is correct. 196 Therefore, there is scant evidence to indicate that increasing board autonomy leads to long-term investment and development, as managerialists claim. Short-termism should not be used as a proxy for managerialism; 197 the managerial approach is not bolstered by reliance on short-termism and any call for greater board autonomy must stand or fall on its own merits.
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E. REGULATORY RECOMMENDATIONS
As the earlier sections have identified, there are transmission mechanisms in UK company law and takeover regulation that lead to short-term tendencies in the market and affect the management of companies. As a consequence, managers focus on short-term results to avoid the company becoming a takeover target, to earn higher compensation, and to prevent their removal from the board. Thus, the recommendations proposed are aimed at corporate governance reform. These are in line with this ministerial statement of Stephen Byers, then
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry:
The key to shaping the market in ways that achieve our twin objectives of efficiency and social justice lie in the framework of rules within which companies do business and make a profit. So company law and corporate governance are at the heart of our debate about the kind of society we want and the nature of our economy. 199 termism's grip. The following recommendations focus on the transmission mechanisms identified earlier as effective: takeovers, shareholder activism, and executive remuneration.
Takeovers
Without a change to the Code, takeovers will continue to act as a transmission mechanism.
Removing the non-frustration principle contained in Rule 21 would enable ex ante shareholder authorisation of certain defensive actions. 202 The possibility of change is acknowledged, but UK and EU corporate law limit the availability of takeover defences that 'provide management with considerable discretion to resist if not unequivocally prohibit a bid.' 203 Removal of Rule 21 would remove a prohibition of shareholders' contractual expression, 204 but with 'trivial impact on activity levels in the market for corporate control.' 205 If approval is not readily given, short-termist views will still be transmitted into corporate decision-making. Hostile takeovers are seen as a transmission mechanism, and an obvious solution does not present itself.
Shareholder Activism
Currently, shareholder activism is not perceived to be acting as a transmission mechanism.
There are many championing the rights of shareholders to utilise their 'voice' in corporate governance matters, with the Kay Review emphasising the importance of the quality of engagement by investors and promoting a broadening of the existing concept of stewardship. 206 A key test for stewardship will be the impact of increasing shareholder power over remuneration since 2013, 207 as it is feared fragmentation of shareholding will prevent this making a real tangible impact. 
Executive Remuneration
The issue with executive remuneration is not that directors are paid too much, but that they are 'paid too much for doing the wrong things.' 211 Current arrangements encourage a 'heads I win, tails you lose' perspective on decision-making. 212 The structure of remuneration should be altered to promote long-term value and reward directors for achieving this. Potential trade-offs associated with this recommendation include a higher turnover of executives or early departure if they believe the share price has peaked, to capture some of the value. 218 Though labour mobility at this level is often overstated, this possibility cannot be ruled out. 219 The executive's successor must also continue to perform well or the reward will decrease. A period of five years is suggested, as it may strike a balance by incentivising a longterm focus without rendering the director at the mercy of their successor's achievements. When evaluating these trade-offs, one must bear in mind that LTIPs, Career Shares, and similar schemes represent only a portion of director's pay. 220 Therefore, it seems unlikely the recommendation will have a drastic impact on executive turnover. On balance, it is argued
Career Shares encourage long-term thinking without rendering executive positions financially unappealing.
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The composition of the remuneration committee also merits examination. If nonexecutive members of the committee are executive directors of other companies and will indirectly benefit from an increased market standard, 222 this may lead to increasing remuneration. Preventing these members from holding the position of committee chair could alleviate undue pressure to increase remuneration. 223 To reward directors properly on performance increasing long-term value, Career Shares remedy the short-term aspect of performance-based remuneration. In addition, neutrality of the remuneration committee, at least for the position of chair, will prevent excessive generosity as a result of isomorphism of practice combined with indirect self-interest.
F. CONCLUSION
The short-termist argument recognises the importance of maximising long-term value and, from an economic perspective, the argument incorporates market imperfections and the reality that we have to strive for efficiency. It values patience, perseverance, and faith in future rewards, 224 and therefore it came as no surprise that the argument caught the imagination of the corporate legal world and has become a common feature in media and academic commentary.
This paper has examined short-termism from a UK perspective, finding evidence of shorttermism in market characteristics like decreasing holding periods, the knowledge and nature of investors. The available evidence is reflective of a harmful short-term focus, which would benefit from action by legislators and regulators. After analysing the perceived weaknesses of the short-termist argument, including arguments that shortening of the average holding period is due to HFT, and that the market displays excessive long-termism, this author finds that these are not sufficiently convincing to alter that conclusion. perceptions of short-termism alone can lead to managerial myopia. Managers might take actions to increase current earnings at the expense of long-term growth, due to a belief that short-termism pervades the market.
In a letter to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders, Warren Buffett wrote, 'when we own portions of outstanding businesses with outstanding managements, our favourite holding period is forever.' 225 This serves as a reminder that effective engagement between managements and investors can lead to long-term success. However, if mechanisms transmit a short-term focus from the market to the corporate decision-making body, executives are not focused on the long-term: they are behaving myopically. The consequences of short-termism in the market are determined by the corporate legal and regulatory landscape. After examining the impact of hostile takeovers, shareholder activism and executive remuneration, the primary conclusion of this paper is that short-termism in public firms is something that should affect regulatory and legislative proposals in the UK. There are sufficient mechanisms transmitting short-termism present in the markets to corporate decision-making to render the phenomenon worthy of regulatory attention. In particular, hostile takeovers and executive remuneration are particularly effective transmission mechanisms, with shareholder activism's impact circumscribed by the costs of collective action and rational apathy.
The regulatory proposals contained in this paper demonstrate a path reform should take, including an endorsement of Main's Career Shares and reform of the composition of remuneration committees. Breaking the transmission mechanism is key to preventing shorttermism creeping its way further into corporate decision-making. As the transmission mechanisms are multi-faceted, reforms involving many stakeholders are necessary. This paper therefore offers solutions to combat managerial myopia and re-focus executive attention to long-term value creation.
